Premetto che questo è un post semi-serio e volutamente provocatorio. Nasce da una riflessione a cavallo tra due voli (forse a causa della mancanza di ossigeno…) e dalla lettura di due articoletti.
Il primo, letto sul volo di andata, è di Robert Haddick, è stato pubblicato da The National Interest e già dal titolo è piuttosto esplicito: “The Civilianization of War“. L’autore, ricercatore e già contractor del Comando forze speciali del Pentagono, nota come la tendenza degli ultimi conflitti sia la “civilizzazione” degli stessi. Ove per civilizzazione non si deve intendere un addolcimento degli scontri bensì l’intervento di truppe civili, generalmente eterodirette. Il caso ucraino è un caso di scuola: Mosca ha usato i civili (veri o militari occultati) come forza d’assalto per raggiungere obiettivi militari. Un passo in avanti rispetto alla tecniche classiche della guerriglia la cui natura è, generalmente, difensiva.
Scrive Haddick:

Much more likely will be a steady and methodical civilian-led unconventional warfare campaign in eastern Ukrainian cities, funded and organized by Moscow and led in the field by Russia’s intelligence services and special-operations forces. The goal of this campaign will be to organize pro-Russian resistance to Ukrainian government institutions, gradually discredit the government in Kiev, intimidate neutral and pro-Ukrainian populations in the area into passivity, and ultimately create legitimacy for the idea of a pro-Russian region in eastern Ukraine under Russian sponsorship. This style of political-military operation very likely stands a better chance of achieving Moscow’s goals, compared to an old-style invasion by tanks, infantry and artillery. If successful, it would also show that “civilianization” of modern offensive military operations has come of age. […]

What explains the civilianization of modern warfare? We have long become used to insurgent militias that have sprung up to defend populations and territory from enemy armies attempting stabilization and pacification. Insurgent militias have used the local population for protection from modern military firepower, to hide from occupation forces, and for logistical support. The most advanced military hardware and well-trained conventional soldiers have proven vulnerable to insurgent weapons and tactics. When insurgent forces have enjoyed a sanctuary in which to organize and train and the support of an outside sponsor, they have usually been able to outlast the political patience of Western stabilization campaigns.
Such insurgencies are defensive responses to occupation and are a fixture throughout history. The offensive use of civilianized assault forces by Russia, China and others is an interesting new trend. Just as Western occupation armies have been understandably reluctant to employ their massive firepower during stabilization operations, the conventional military forces responsible for defending Ukrainian bases in Crimea or outposts in the South and East China Seas are similarly flummoxed when confronted by the sudden arrival of crowds of civilians, especially when armed with cameras connected to global media-distribution networks. […] The modern media-saturated age has only encourage the expanded use of civilianized defensive and offensive military operations and even increased their effectiveness.”

Da civili usati come scudo a scopo difensivo si è passato ai civili adoperati come un vero e proprio ariete offensivo, il tutto al riparo da una risposta militare convenzionale.
Sostiene Haddick, in definitiva, che questa “nuova” forma di conflittualità (“Civilianized Warfare”) spiazza l’Occidente che non è preparato ed addestrato a confrontarsi su questo piano.

L’altro giorno, sul volo di ritorno, ho letto lo scambio tra Jarno Limnéll e Thomas Rid pubblicate nell’ultimo numero di Foreign Affairs. In breve, Rid faceva notare che investire milioni di dollari per costituire Cyber-Command sul modello di quello americano potrebbe risultare in uno sperpero di risorse:

[…] it is unlikely that an independent cyber command would accomplish much. Hawkish generals and politicians ignore the fact that it is quite difficult to create a cyberweapon, software that can physically harm an opponent’s critical infrastructure. There is a reason why proponents of such operations have only one proper example to draw on: Stuxnet, a U.S.-Israeli operation that was designed to damage Iranian uranium-enrichment centrifuges. A high-end sabotage campaign is likely to be a complex, intelligence-devouring, labor-intensive, and target-specific engineering challenge. As frustrated and confused lower-ranking insiders have told me, their superiors balk at that reality and turn to developers and say, in general terms, “Build me a cyber–Tomahawk missile.”
This relates to a third problem: a potential arms race in cyberspace. If having a cyber command becomes a symbol of power, other nations will want to have their own cyber commands. Some countries, among them the United Kingdom, are already considering plans to waste significant resources on offensive cyber-capabilities, needlessly gearing up for a cyberwar that may never occur.
Finally, the idea of creating an independent cyber command ignores the fact that refined offensive capabilities do not translate into better defensive ones. Many conventional weapons can be used defensively or offensively. But cyberweapons are different; Stuxnet, for example, could be used only offensively. The NSA’s offensive strategy exploits vulnerabilities, or “back doors,” in widely used software. But U.S. computer systems have back doors, too: just ask Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor who leaked classified information about such vulnerabilities. In cybersecurity, a good offense is the worst defense.
U.S. officials should work to prevent a “cyber–Pearl Harbor” through better defenses. But waiting for cyberwar, as Limnéll suggests, is a failure of imagination. “This is our cyber-9/11,” a British intelligence official told me, referring to the Snowden leaks. “We just imagined it differently.”

Avevo da poco finito di leggere questo articolo, l’aereo aveva abbassato il carrello, quando ho avuto un’illuminazione sotto forma di domanda. Un dubbio, più che altro, che giro a tutti voi. Ma non è che il cyber – tema rilevantissimo, sia chiaro – sta distogliendo la nostra attenzione da minacce ben più reali e pericolose ma, al momento, poco evidenti ed ancor meno “alla moda”?