Il Council on Foreign Relations ha elaborato un piccolo ma interessantissimo scenario che consiglio vivamente di leggere. Quanto petrolio servirebbe – si è chiesta Rosemary Kelanic – in caso di conflitto aereo tra Cina e Taiwan? Attenzione: parliamo di solo conflitto aereo.
I risultati confermano le conclusioni degli analisti riguardo agli obiettivi delle politiche energetiche cinesi. Riporto quasi integralmente le conclusioni dello studio perchè molto chiare:

Several important implications arise from these results. Most broadly, the analysis suggests that military demand for petroleum products during a major conventional conflict is significantly larger than commonly assumed—and potentially large enough to strain supplies, particularly when civilian demand is figured in. Both China and Taiwan face a tighter wartime fuel supply situation than default assumptions about military consumption would suggest.
PLAAF requirements in the air war scenario are sizeable; military demand alone totals 76,000 barrels of jet fuel daily, which would eat up nearly half of China’s projected 164,000 barrels of indigenous jet fuel production. This figure is remarkable given that China is the fourth-largest petroleum producer in the world. By drawing down from its stockpiles, China could meet full military and civilian needs for about a month and a half, after which it would have to slash its civilian consumption of 340,000 barrels daily by about seventy-five percent to meet military requirements. Taiwan’s daily military jet fuel demand is almost 16,000 barrels—nearly four times larger than its civilian consumption of 4,200. If Taiwan could protect its oil refineries and strategic reserves in a war with China, it could meet all of its combined military and civilian jet fuel needs in an air war for five months—about three times longer than China could. However, the vulnerability of Taiwan’s oil facilities to attack potentially undermines this advantage.
The analysis also emphasizes the value of anticipatory measures, particularly stockpiling and air defense, for bolstering national security in an emergency. In particular, military fuel requirements should not be overlooked. Although petroleum stockpiles are often measured according to how many days’ worth of normal civilian demand they can fulfill, the more important factor may be the number of days they can provide of emergency demand—taking into account military scenarios that may push overall requirements significantly above peacetime consumption.
The potential strain on both countries’ fuel supplies may encourage them to pursue foreign policies that would bolster oil access in a worst-case conflict scenario. This is unsurprising for Taiwan, which has no crude oil resources to speak of, and has already stocked its strategic oil reserves with military contingencies in mind. It is surprising for China, though, given its domestic petroleum resources. China could produce enough jet fuel indigenously to prosecute an air war with Taiwan indefinitely, but not without risking political consequences to the Communist Party. This finding casts a new light on China’s “going out” initiatives to secure petroleum through equity oil arrangements and closer ties with exporters like Saudi Arabia. Already China has built overland pipelines to Kazakhstan, which diversifies its petroleum transit routes away from reliance on the Strait of Malacca. Additionally, it is building a commercial port that some speculate may later lead to further naval facilities in Gwadar, Pakistan (just outside the Persian Gulf) and developing infrastructure for overland trade to the Middle East. If Beijing truly fears the prospects of a U.S. naval blockade during a war with Taiwan, such efforts are likely to increase.