A 12 anni dall’attacco qaedista agli Stati Uniti un gruppo di quattro esperti, tra i quali Bruce Hoffman e Peter Bergen, ha effettuato una ricognizione della minaccia jihadista a livello internazionale. Il risultato è questo studio pubblicato dal Bipartisan Policy Center: “Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment“.
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Since 2002, al-Qaeda has embraced a strategy that transformed it into a decentralized, networked, transnational movement, rather than the single monolithic entity it was on the eve of 9/11. This strategy was undoubtedly the result of necessity; U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the wake of the 9/11 attacks largely obliterated al-Qaeda as an organization. But it has allowed al-Qaeda to persist, and it now poses a threat that is more amorphous and difficult to pinpoint than it was in the early 2000s.
[…] Al-Qaeda’s strategy today consists of two elements: increasingly encouraging “lone wolf” attacks in the West, and trying to take advantage of the recent revolutions and social upheaval in those Arab, North African, and West African countries where the network continues to operate.
[…] The unrest that swept the Arab world in the wake of the Arab Spring provided extremist groups with more room to operate and injected large amounts of arms into the region. Taking advantage of these circumstances, Al-Qaeda affiliates subsequently gained significant footholds in Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen. Prison breaks across the region, including two major prison breaks in Pakistan and Iraq during July 2013, have also enabled al-Qaeda-associated groups to regenerate some of their strength. However, to date, jihadist violence in the Middle East has focused on domestic targets. And in countries such as Mali and Yemen, jihadist militants have overplayed their hands and have suffered real reverses in the past year or so.
[…] The extent to which a shift to “far enemy” targets in the West might occur—as al-Qaeda shifted its focus during the late-1990s—will depend on the outcome of the Syrian civil war and the fortunes of al-Qaeda’s affiliate there, Jabhat al-Nusra; the trajectory of al-Qaeda-aligned groups in ther countries in the Middle East and Africa; and the impact of the military overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government led by Mohammed Morsi in Egypt on the Islamist movement in general.