Un po’ per curiosità, un po’ per organizzare un post sull’argomento, sono andato a rivedere le previsioni dei principali istituti di analisi e risk assessment sul nostro vicino d’oltremare.
Ecco come l’Economist Intelligence Unit, nel suo Country Report, descriveva la situazione politica in Libia. Il Report è del novembre dello scorso anno ma chi ha letto quello di gennaio mi ha confermato che le previsioni sono sostanzialmente le medesime

Outlook for 2011-2015: Political power will remain vested in the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi. Libya will retain its unique jamahiriya (republic of the people) system, but the structures of government will undergo halting reform. Colonel Qadhafi’s most likely successor is his son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. However, he faces entrenched opposition from other elements in the regime, as well as rivalry from some of his siblings.
The Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, has ruthlessly repressed political dissent, and there are now few real domestic threats to his rule. He has now been in power for over 40 years and will continue to be careful to balance the competing power structures within the political hierarchy. Colonel Qadhafi is likely to withdraw gradually from domestic politics, investing more time in international politics, such as his symbolic role as the “king of kings of Africa.

There is no agreed process for the transfer of power, but Colonel Qadhafi’s tacit support for a number of reforms proposed by his son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi has made him the most likely successor. Saif Qadhafi therefore appears to have some mandate to implement his economic and political reform programme— he has long been in favour of creating a formal constitution and of implementing administrative and market-oriented reform. Other possible successors include one of Colonel Qadhafi’s other six children. However, many Libyans would deeply resent an orchestrated dynastic arrangement and someone may emerge from within the political elite. There is a conservative “old guard” within the regime with considerable vested interests that appears to be staunchly resisting any liberal reforms. This is adding to a climate of uncertainty that could lead to a period of instability immediately after Colonel Qadhafi departs the scene.

However, the succession is unlikely to become a pressing issue while Colonel Qadhafi retains power, which he is expected to do throughout the forecast period.There is at present little immediate threat to the ruling elite. However, if the socioeconomic environment were to deteriorate through, for example, rising unemployment, collapsing oil prices or growing inequality, the government could be faced with increased unrest. Feelings of political exclusion have been exacerbated by the disruption of Libya’s independent media, which were nationalised in June 2009 and face repeated suspensions. However, with the economy expected to remain relatively strong and the opposition, with the  exception of domestic Islamists, either in exile or lacking clout and coherence, the prospect of any threat to the regime appears limited.

The greatest fear for the authorities remains the potential challenge from homegrown militant Islamist groups, in light of regionwide concerns over the threat posed by al-Qaida affiliates and past Islamist-inspired assassination attempts against Colonel Qadhafi. Reconciliation and rehabilitation negotiations have proceeded secretly, and a steady stream of Islamists has been released from prison in recent months, including 39 from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group— the largest local militant organisation, which recently renounced violence. This suggests that the local militant Islamist threat is declining.