Un interessante studio sull'attacco russo alla Georgia nell'agosto del 2008 e su come le operazioni nel cyber-spazio sono state efficacemente integrate con le tattiche militari convenzionali. Uno dei pochi saggi (nel mare magnum della CMF*) in cui si ragiona su principi strategici.
Per David Hollis, infatti, il conflitto georgiano è il primo caso di attacco nel cyber-space sincronizzato con vere e proprie operazioni militari in aria, su terra ed in mare. Esso fornisce quindi una serie di utili insegnamenti, tattici e strategici, operativi e d'intelligence.

"Three developing trends that extend across the levels of warfare from strategic to tactical are: 1) the increasing ability of network intelligence operatives at all levels to exfiltrate critical information from potential opponents and neutral players that is valuable for military, economic, diplomatic, and social/cultural purposes; 2) the increasing value of controlling and degrading/denying an opponent‟s media and publicity message (Information Operations) through denial/disruption/degrading and subversion of targeted information conduits such as web sites, voice over IP (VOIP), chat rooms, social networking sites (Twitter, FaceBook, etc .. ), and other cyberspace technology-based communications mediums; and 3) the time-sensitive nature of cyberspace warfare – a nation cannot engage in cyberspace warfare from a cold start, it must have well-developed tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities developed well in advance of any conflict. These capabilities are represented by trained human capital supported by doctrine, organization, command and control (C2), and technology that has been developed, tested, and refined in strenuous cyberspace combat exercises. Cyberspace intelligence capabilities and situational awareness also need to be developed long before any potential conflict involving the cyberspace domain.
Doctrinal concepts such as center of gravity and effects based targeting; and military principals such as mass, economy of force, C2, surprise, and unity of effort apply equally to military operations in the cyberspace domain as to operations in the other domains. Attacking and defeating the enemy‟s center of gravity and breaking the will of the enemy to continue the conflict are traditional objectives of warfare and they are as applicable to the cyberspace domain as any other warfighting domain.
At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, (alleged) Russian cyberspace operations were closely synchronized to achieve effects with their land, air, and sea domain military operations. It appears that networks and web sites within specific geographic locations were targeted for denial and disruption operations in order to cause panic and uncertainty (disruption) in the Georgian civilian population, hindering an effective military response. Georgian hacker forums were targeted early-in the process to preempt, disrupt, and degrade retaliatory operations. At the strategic level, these cyberspace actions supported attacks upon the Georgian center of gravity via propaganda attacks and by impeding official government web sites, obstructing the flow of military and intergovernmental information, and degrading/denying communications (internal and external). The intelligence lessons learned from these cyberspace operations represent tactical and operational level attack sensing and warning (AS&W) indicators as well as strategic-level indicators of potential national conflict. Any one of these individual indicators is probably happening in cyberspace every day so it is difficult to sort through the potential avalanche of Internet, wireless, and electronic spectrum intelligence data. But correlating and fusing cyberspace intelligence from all of these levels and sources in a central fusion center (or, better yet, a well-networked set of collaborative centers….) can help provide a more comprehensive intelligence/situational picture. All-source intelligence collection and analysis within the cyberspace domain is critical, as is combining cyberintelligence with other forms of traditional intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc…) to gain a complete fusion of all-source intelligence."

Alla fine la domanda sorge spontanea: in Italia, alla luce di quanto sopra, come siamo messi in quanto a dottrina, capacità operative e d'intelligence?

* Messaggio in codice per Jack, Giovanni e gli Allegri… :))